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INTRODUCTION
Every hour of every day,1 a woman in India dies over someone’s
dissatisfaction with her dowry.2 Sometimes she is killed outright,
other times the new bride is driven to suicide.3 They call these dowry
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law. Thank
you to my wonderful colleagues here in the Rocky Mountain Collective on Race, Place, and
Law for their support and thoughtful conversation through early iterations. Thanks es-
pecially are due to Nancy Ehrenreich, Margaret Kwoka and Kris McDaniel-Miccio, for
their keen insights. This work could not have been completed without the outstanding
work of research assistants Padraic Emerine and Jessica Rehms, who brought order and
fresh perspective to a daunting task. Finally, I am grateful to my family for their support
and patience throughout.
1. Dowry Deaths: One Woman Dies Every Hour, TIMES OF INDIA (Sept. 1, 2013,
11:00 AM), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Dowry-deaths-One-woman-dies-every
-hour/articleshow/22201659.cms [http://perma.cc/H52V-YSSE].
2. Dowry is the wealth given to a daughter when she marries, though modern practice
passes much of the wealth to her new husband and in-laws. Id.
3. Martin Rew, Geetanjali Gangoli & Aisha K. Gill, Violence Between Female In-Laws
in India, J. INT’L WOMEN’S STUD., Jan. 2013, at 147, 155.
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deaths,4 and in 2014 alone, officials reported 8,455 cases.5 The sheer
scale of this terrible crime is sometimes presented as the strongest
evidence that India is robustly patriarchal, but such claims miss the
mark; the stronger evidence of India’s patriarchy is not that these
women die over dowry, but that so many of them die at the hands of
other women.
Housed in one wing of Delhi’s infamous Tihar jail are some of
these brutal killers.6 Their victims have died violently—poisoned or
forced to drink acid, beaten or pushed from balconies, and, all too
commonly, doused with kerosene and set on fire.7 Tihar jail staff
have named the wing for the prisoners who live there—they call it
simply “the mother-in-law wing.” 8
Why are women, like the mothers-in-law of Tihar jail, killing
other women? Next to husbands, mothers-in-law are the most likely
to be convicted of these terrible crimes.9 Accepting that India is a
patriarchal society, we might expect to see women dying at the hands
of men, but these women and their crimes are a surprise. These
women, it appears, are part of the problem.
4. The term dowry deaths is intended to encompass both suicides and homicides
that occur in the context of dowry harassment. It is difficult to find official figures which
disaggregate these events. Where the distinction is to be made, I will refer to the homi-
cides as dowry murders. My terminology is only half consistent with the wording of Sec-
tion 304B, the Dowry Death provision, which does not refer to the homicides as dowry
murders separately. See PEN. CODE § 304B (1860) (amended 1986).
5. INDIA NAT’L CRIME RECORDS BUREAU, CRIME IN INDIA 2014, at tbl. 1.3 (2015),
http://ncrb.gov.in/StatPublications/CII/CII2014/Statistics%202014.pdf [http://perma.cc
/GP4H-JQ5X].
6. Tihar jail holds over 13,500 inmates and holds prisoners from Delhi and sur-
rounding areas. See India Prisoners Dig Tunnel to Escape from Tihar Jail, BBC NEWS
(June 29, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-33307912 [http://perma.cc
/J62D-U6KG]. It was known for harsh conditions, particularly prior to the reforms imple-
mented by Kiran Bedi. See Rahil Shaikh, Ray of Hope: Tihar Jail Helps Reform Inmates
by Starting Recruitment Drive, DNA INDIA (May 6, 2014, 7:25 AM), http://www.dnaindia
.com/india/report-ray-of-hope-tihar-jail-helps-reform-inmates-by-starting-recruitment
-drive-1985685 [http://perma.cc/B72K-X2UV]; see also Mahinder Singh Manra & Mansi
Tewari, Tihar Overflowing with Dowry Cases: How Infamous Delhi Jail is Crammed to
Bursting with Women Accused of Harassment, DAILY MAIL (July 6, 2014, 4:19 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2682604/Tihar-overflowing-dowry
-cases-How-infamous-Delhi-jail-crammed-bursting-women-accused-harassment.html
[http://perma.cc/DR4Q-8AT3].
7. Hence the popular but grisly appellation “bride burnings.” See #Dowry Murders:
106,000 Women Burnt to Death in 1 Year, 50 MILLION MISSING CAMPAIGN (Oct. 2, 2011),
http://genderbytes.wordpress.com/2011/10/02/video-murder-by-fire-100000-women-a-year
[http://perma.cc/3EUG-TVRY]. Consider that the legislation refers to this method of kill-
ing specifically—PEN. CODE § 304B (1860) (amended 1986).
8. Hamida Ghafour, Why Tensions are Soaring in Mother (in-Law) India, TORONTO
STAR (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/02/17/why_tensions_are
_soaring_in_mother_inlaw_india.html [http://perma.cc/G8GK-RFP7].
9. See Rew, Gangoli & Gill, supra note 3, at 148.
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India is laboring to end dowry deaths, mostly through criminal
legislation. These laws threaten severe punishments for dowry and
dowry violence, but they stop short of uncovering the actual forces
that drive crimes against women. Such reforms, though facially pro-
gressive, are of limited value. Dowry appears an obvious evil, but
there are other practices, seemingly benign, that reinforce existing
power dynamics and ultimately serve to sustain Indian patriarchy.
Patriarchy is not power on a single vector traveling in only one di-
rection; it is a swirling system of power and dominance that sweeps
in even women as agents and accomplices.10
This Article examines more closely the participation of mothers-
in-law in India’s dowry murders to gain a better understanding of
these dynamics and to expose the limits of existing reforms. I first
turn to the participation of women in dowry death cases and the
ways in which their participation challenges our conventional under-
standing of patriarchy and societal manifestation. In Part II, I pro-
vide an overview of dowry deaths in India. In Part III, I survey the
different criminal provisions related to dowry deaths and demon-
strate how these laws actually operate within a set of cultural prac-
tices that support female subjugation. Part IV presents some theories
of why these women participate in killing other women. In Part V,
I examine how the courts’ conservative characterizations of the
women in these crimes—as perpetrators and as victims—serve to
trap women in subordinate roles. Finally, I conclude with some
observations for the future.
I. THE CURIOUS CASES OF WOMEN WHO KILL WOMEN
That dowry deaths occur at all is tragic, but it is the curious par-
ticipation of women in so many dowry deaths that is so shocking.11
10. Patriarchy is defined as a social power structure where male power is elevated
and female power is reduced. BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (2012). Marilyn Fernandez,
Domestic Violence by Extended Family Members in India: Interplay of Gender and
Generation, 12 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 433, 439–40 (1997) (discussing the multiple
ways patriarchy influences decisions and co-opts even women to participate).
11. It is estimated that at least 20%, and likely a much more substantial proportion
of dowry death cases involve females among the active perpetrators. See P. M. K. Mili,
R. Perumal, & Neethu Susan Cherian, Female Criminality in India: Prevalence, Causes
and Preventive Measures, 10 INT’L J. CRIM. JUST. SCI 65, 68 (2015); Mudita Rastogi & Paul
Therly, Dowry and its Link to Violence Against Women in India, 7 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, &
ABUSE 66, 71 (2006) (citing a study in which “more than 90 per cent [sic]” of Supreme
Court dowry death convictions between 1990 and 1995 involved the participation of a
mother-in-law).
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Even the Supreme Court of India has been moved to comment upon
the proportion of dowry victims killed by another woman:
Of late there has been an alarming increase in cases relating to
harassment, torture, abetted suicides and dowry deaths of young
innocent brides. . . . It is more disturbing and sad that in most
of such reported cases it is the woman who plays a pivotal role
in this crime against the younger woman . . . .12
Sadly, the mother-in-law frequently appears as a primary perpe-
trator.13 Indeed, the mother-in-law/daughter-in-law conflict has come
to typify dowry death cases,14 even though the manner of death and
participation of others vary.
In some cases, the mother-in-law has harassed and badgered her
daughter-in-law so badly that the young woman is driven to suicide.15
In the case of Bikshapathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, the mother-in-
law became abusive when her postwedding demands for additional
gold and a television set were not met.16 Financially drained from the
wedding expenses, and having already given a substantial dowry, the
young bride’s middle-class parents could not meet these demands.17
The mother-in-law prevented her daughter-in-law, Rajyalakshmi,
from seeing her parents and continued to demand the television set
and additional gold.18 Gifts of new clothes and a gold ring did not
satisfy her.19 Even a visit from Rajyalakshmi’s mother beseeching
that her daughter not be ill-treated had no effect.20 Instead the
mother-in-law continued to mistreat Rajyalakshmi, even denying her
food.21 Rajyalakshmi’s parents brought her to their home for protec-
tion, but when she tried to extend her stay with them her husband
threatened to end the marriage.22 Eventually, Rajyalakshmi, just
12. Subrahmanyam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 2 SCR. 666, 689 (India).
13. See Rastogi & Therly, supra note 11.
14. See Rew, Gangoli & Gill, supra note 3, at 155.
15. Recall that under § 304B, dowry deaths encompass both suicides and homicides
subsequent to dowry harassment. PEN. CODE § 304B (1860) (amended 1986). It is well-
accepted that some suicides are due to dowry-harassment by in-laws. See, e.g., Imran
Gowhar, Alleged Dowry Harassment Leads to Death of Newly-Married, THE HINDU
(April 12, 2015), http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/bangalore/alleged-dowry-harassment
-leads-to-death-of-newlymarried/article7095393.ece [https://perma.cc/334Q-UFBC]. There
are also numerous reported cases where the victim has committed suicide due to dowry
harassment. See, e.g., Smt. Annapurnabai v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1999) Cr. L.J.
2696.; State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh (1991) AIR 1532.
16. Bikshapathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Cr. A. No. 918 of 1988, at para. 7 (HC,
Andhra Pradesh Oct. 27, 1988).
17. Id. at paras. 6–7.
18. Id. at para. 7.
19. Id. at paras. 7–8.
20. Id. at paras. 8–9.
21. Id.
22. Id. at para. 9.
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nineteen years old and married only two years, was found dead in
her kitchen.23 She had poured kerosene on herself and set herself
on fire.24
In other cases, the mother-in-law acts in concert with other
family members to kill the daughter-in-law. For instance, in Ranjit
Singh v. State of Punjab, the in-laws harassed their daughter-in-law,
Jaswinder, over their dissatisfaction with the dowry.25 Although a
significant dowry had been negotiated and provided at the time
of the wedding,26 the in-laws maltreated Jaswinder from the very
first days. They soon complained about the quality of the dowry
goods provided and further demanded a car.27 Additional “gifts” from
Jaswinder’s family did not satisfy the in-laws.28 They even threat-
ened Jaswinder.29 Just four months after the wedding, after berat-
ing her again about the car, the mother-in-law grabbed Jaswinder by
the back of her neck and hauled her into a room where the rest of the
family was waiting.30 There, Jaswinder’s husband held her down
while the father-in-law and the sister-in-law egged them on.31 To-
gether, Jaswinder’s mother-in-law and husband strangled her until
she was dead.32 Tragically, just the day before, Jaswinder had con-
fided to her mother about the abuse, but she was murdered before
her mother could rescue her.33
In another case, Subrahmanyam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, a
young bride, Koti Nagbani, was harassed by her husband and his
family because the land portion of her dowry had been registered ex-
clusively in her name.34 She was continually harassed and tormented
by her in-laws and denied leave to see her parents or even to have
them visit her.35 She wrote letters secretly to her sister disclosing
the state of affairs and her fears.36 Only a year and half after the
wedding, neighbors heard terrible screams coming from the house.37
They came running and witnessed the husband, mother-in-law, and
23. Id. at para. 3.
24. Id.
25. Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, Cr. A. No. 510 of 2007, at para. 2 (SC, July 3, 2013).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at para. 13.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at para. 15.
34. Subrahmanyam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 2 SCR 666, 669.
35. Id. at 680.
36. Id. at 680–81.
37. Id. at 683–84.
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father-in-law hurriedly exiting the kitchen.38 They found Koti Nagbani
lying on the kitchen floor engulfed in flames;39 her mother-in-law
and husband made no attempt to save her. In her dying declaration,
Koti Nagbani said her mother-in-law had poured kerosene on her
and her husband had ignited it.40
In a few cases, the mother-in-law acts independently. Consider
Shrimati Paniben v. State of Gujarat.41 Bai Kanta was only eighteen
but had been married for five years, and had a young daughter.42
While her marriage appeared happy, her relationship with her
mother-in-law was strained and difficult.43 On one occasion, Bai Kanta
even left home and went to her parents’ house.44 She returned to her
husband only after her mother-in-law came to get her and her father-
in-law promised nothing would go wrong.45 But the mistreatment
continued.46 Bai Kanta awoke one night to find her mother-in-law
sprinkling kerosene on her.47 As she ran out of the room, her mother-
in-law threw a match on her and she was engulfed in flames.48 De-
spite the desperate efforts of her father-in-law and husband, Bai
Kanta died later that night.49
This is only a tiny window into the hundreds of cases of dowry
death perpetrated by women every year. These facts truly are dis-
turbing. This is partly because the violence is extreme, but moreso
because of the gender of the perpetrator and the nature of the crime.
In our minds, we have a set understanding of the nature of women
and the nature of violence against women. We believe that women
are not violent; we believe that women are not killers. We also be-
lieve that women are victims, not perpetrators; women don’t hurt
women—men hurt women.
Our beliefs are amply supported by history and crime statis-
tics. Women make up only a fraction of all offenders, and an even
smaller fraction of violent offenders. There were only about 111,000
female offenders in the United States in correctional facilities in
38. Id.
39. Subrahmanyam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 2 SCR 666, 683–84.
40. Id.
41. Paniben v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCR 197; see also Lichhamadevi v. State of
Rajasthan, (1988) 4 SCC 456.
42. Id. at 200.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 197.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 198.
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2013, compared to almost 1.5 million men.50 Only about one third
of sentenced female offenders (about 38,000) were serving time for
violent offenses.51 Compare this to about half of male offenders
(about 760,000) who were serving time for violent offenses.52 In
other parts of the world, women make up even less of the violent of-
fender population.53 
Even rarer are women who kill. Legal and social examinations
of women who have killed have fallen primarily into two types:54
women who kill in self-defense (including cases where women kill
their abusers);55 and women who kill as a result of severe mental
illness (often in cases of infanticide).56 In other words, women kill
only when they have no other choice, or are so mentally ill that they
have no control over their own actions.57 These are the cases which
leap to mind when we are asked to think of female killers. Even so,
we recognize that these cases are rarities; they do not dilute our
common view that women are simply not violent.
This view is also borne out when we consider domestic abuse.
Worldwide, most cases of domestic violence involve a male perpetra-
tor and a female victim.58 In cases of serious physical injury, it is in-
flicted almost exclusively by men.59 We rightly perceive most abusers
to be men and most victims to be women.
50. E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ247282, PRISONERS IN 2013,
at 2 (2014).
51. Id. at 15.
52. Id.
53. See PENAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL PRISON TRENDS 2015, at 14 (2015),
http://penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/PRI-Prisons-global-trends-report-LR
.pdf [http://perma.cc/4PVT-PAWY].
54. See Rew, Gangoli & Gill, supra note 3, at 148. Some might also suggest adding
a third category to include those women who kill out of jealousy as a result of infidelity,
but this group is fairly small. A last category, exceedingly rare, might be those women who
are serial killers. See BELINDA MORRISSEY, WHEN WOMEN KILL: QUESTIONS OF AGENCY
AND SUBJECTIVITY 39 (2003).
55. VICKIE JENSEN, WHY WOMEN KILL: HOMICIDE AND GENDER EQUALITY 10–11 (2001).
56. Consider, for example, the case of Andrea Yates, who drowned her five children
in the bathtub of her Houston home in the throes of a postpartum depression and psy-
chosis. See Andrew Cohen, 10 Years Later, the Tragedy of Andrea Yates, THE ATLANTIC
(Mar. 11, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/03/10-years-later-the
-tragedy-of-andrea-yates/254290 [http://perma.cc/6U26-GKJG]; see also Rashmi Goel,
Can I Call Kimura Crazy?: Ethical Tensions in the Cultural Defense, 3 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 443, 443 (2004) (detailing the legal case of Fumiko Kimura, who attempted a parent-
child suicide in which her two children were killed but she survived and mental illness
was proffered as an explanation).
57. Women killing others outside of these subsets is so rare it has hardly been studied.
It tends to occupy the realm of the freakish and bizarre rather than a reflection of soci-
ety. See MORRISSEY, supra note 54, at 39, 65.
58. Rew, Gangoli & Gill, supra note 3, at 148; Fernandez, supra note 10, at 435.
59. Fernandez, supra note 10, at 436.
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Violence committed by women against other women appears
very rare. There are some notorious cases of harm done by women to
other women, the cases of female genital mutilation where the proce-
dures are performed mostly by women, for instance.60 But these cases
are distinguishable overall as culturally or religiously mandated.
The cases of women who kill women are so rare that there is no
study devoted to it as a general category either in the social science
or legal literature.61 The murderous mothers-in-law of Tihar jail thus
defy our expectations in two ways—first, because they are violent,
and second, because they have killed other women. Our notions about
the very nature of women, and about who has power over them, are
upended, or at least endangered, by the curious cases of women who
kill other women. Even India’s Supreme Court remarked in bewil-
derment: “[I]t is rather strange that the mother-in-law who herself
is a woman should resort to killing another woman. It is hard to
fathom as to why even the “mother” in her did not make her feel.” 62
The phenomenon is rendered even more odd by the context of
the crime itself. Patriarchy, as we generally understand it, is a social
system where men hold the power, and women are excluded, or a
system that privileges male power and reduces or deprecates female
power.63 Accepting that dowry and dowry-related violence are symp-
toms of a patriarchal power structure where men exercise dominance
over women, why would women—any women—participate in it?
Answering that question is important for several reasons: first,
from a legislative perspective, because the criminal law is only legit-
imate when it punishes the morally blameworthy, and that depends
as much on the offender’s mental state and motivation as it does on
the act she commits. Understanding why these women kill may lead
to a different assessment of their culpability. Culpability itself so
often hinges on the “why,” but even where it does not, sentencing
often reflects motive in an effort to temper justice with mercy. For in-
stance, some might argue that these women are victims themselves,
and that their participation in female-on-female violence is actually
coerced. If this is true, the stigma and sanction should be commen-
surately reduced. Second, solutions to preventing any crime are more
likely to be effective when tailored to the motivations of those com-
mitting the crime. Legislative and social reforms need to respond to
the real reasons these women kill if there is to be any chance of suc-
cess. Finally, assuming the objective is to ameliorate the harms of
60. Id. at 438.
61. Although cases of intrasexual hostility and aggression have been studied. Id. at
436, 438.
62. Paniben v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCR 197, 200.
63. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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patriarchy, an understanding of how patriarch works to co-opt women
in its operations is essential to any remedy or progress.
It is estimated that a significant proportion of dowry death
cases involve the mother-in-law as the prime perpetrator.64 India’s
dowry deaths therefore represent a unique opportunity to examine
a substantial group of women who kill women, not available in any
other context.
II. THE PROBLEM OF DOWRY DEATHS
The case stories related here all emphasize the role of dowry
harassment. The laws clearly presuppose that dowry greed is the
primary motivator in the abuse and deaths of these young women. In
India, dowry is a part of most marital alliances.65 Simply put, dowry
is the money and goods a bride takes with her to her marital home
when she marries. It is an ancient tradition. As early as 200 A.D.,
the Laws of Manu refer to the property a women receives at her
nuptials from her family.66
Originally, the dowry was for the exclusive benefit of the bride,
called stridhan (woman’s wealth).67 The dowry served as a kind of
insurance policy to ensure her security if anything happened to her
husband or if she was denied necessaries in her marital home.68 Giv-
ing dowry meant a share of the family wealth passed to a daughter
upon her marriage.69 It consisted primarily of things for her personal
use—jewelry and domestic goods—items that would enhance her en-
joyment in the marital home and were unlikely to be usurped by
anyone else.70 According to many Indian historians and activists,
therefore, dowry is an essentially feminist practice that has been
corrupted by consumer culture.71
Despite its positive origins, modern day dowry practice is decid-
edly less beneficial to women. As dowry evolved to include gifts for the
64. See Rastogi & Therly, supra note 11, at 67. See also Mili, Perumal & Neethu,
supra note 11, at 68 (providing that since at least 2001, females compose about 20% of
persons arrested for dowry deaths, a significantly higher percentage than for almost any
other reported crime type in India).
65. See Leigh Seeger, India’s Dowry Culture, INT’L POL’Y DIG. (July 30, 2013), http://
www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/07/30/indias-dowry-culture [http://perma.cc/BE3Z
-2JLV].
66. See VEENA TALWAR OLDENBURG, DOWRY MURDER: THE IMPERIAL ORIGINS OF A
CULTURAL CRIME 19 (2002).
67. See id. at 19–22; see also The Hindu Succession Act, No. 30 of 1956, INDIA CODE
(1956) (drawing a distinction between dowry and stridhan).
68. See OLDENBURG, supra note 66, at 9.
69. In contrast, sons received their share of the family wealth through inheritance. Id.
70. See id. at 1.
71. Id. at 5.
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groom and his family as well,72 its purpose went from ensuring the
bride’s comfort to ensuring the satisfaction of the groom’s family.73
It is common understanding that the more desirable the groom—
based on education, earning potential and social status—the higher
the dowry required.74 Today, grooms’ families want compensation for
the high cost of educating their sons, and something to offset the cost
of adding another member to the family. For some, a daughter-in-law
is seen as a path to wealth, her presence a burden they bear to get
that wealth.75 In these cases, marriage becomes a business transac-
tion, complete with buyer’s remorse.
This is not new. The insidious harm of dowry was already a
recognized issue during the fight for India’s independence. By the
1950s, it was widely believed that dowry practice contributed signifi-
cantly to the lower status of women.76 Scholars and sociologists agreed
it was at least partly to blame for the poor state of women in Indian
society. Eventually, dowry practice was criminalized in 1961.77 Un-
fortunately, despite the ban, people continued to give dowry, relying
on the legislative exemption for “gifts.” 78 Today, it remains an almost
universal part of the marriage alliance negotiations.79 The tradition
never went away, and any changes seem to be changes for the worse.
Grooms and their families expect, and sometimes demand, expensive
consumer goods and hefty sums in consideration of the marriage.80
When they feel the dowry is inadequate, the result is often marital
strain, verbal harassment of the new bride and her family, and, in far
too many instances, violence. In the worst cases, the result is fatal.
It is difficult to say when dowry deaths and dowry murders
became a recognizable part of Indian society. By the mid-1970s, re-
ports attributing domestic murders to dowry greed had become ubiq-
uitous, and journalists coined the grisly appellation “bride burning”
for those instances where victims were doused with kerosene and
72. Id. at 21.
73. See Edith Samuel, Dowry and Dowry Harassment in India: An Assessment Based
on Modified Capitalist Patriarchy, 1 AFRICAN & ASIAN STUD. 187, 205 (2002).
74. Lionel Caplan, Bridegroom Price in Urban India: Class, Caste and ‘Dowry Evil’
Among Christians in Madras, 19 MAN 216, 220–21 (1984); see Samuel, supra note 73,
at 206. For a modern online dowry calculation model that epitomizes the crass commer-
cialism of the marriage market, see http://www.dowrycalculator.com.
75. See Samuel, supra note 73, at 206.
76. Kirti Singh, Dowry, Violence and the Law, in WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF VIO-
LENCE 247, 256 (Taisha Abraham ed., 2002); see also OLDENBURG, supra note 66, at 5
(stating that the British had already declared almost 100 years earlier that dowry was
the source of female inequality and son-preference).
77. The Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 28 of 1961, INDIA CODE (1961).
78. Id. ¶ 3.
79. Seeger, supra note 65.
80. Caplan, supra note 74, at 217.
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burned alive.81 Nowadays, newspapers are replete with stories of
young women killed, or driven to suicide, by the cruelty of the mar-
ital home and the constant demands for more money.82
Dowry deaths today are pervasive. They happen in every socio-
economic class,83 in every religious group,84 and in every region of
the country.85 Worse, the number of dowry deaths in India continues
to increase.86 In 2000, there were 6,995 dowry deaths across India.87
In 2010, there were 8,391 dowry deaths.88 In 2014, the figure rose
to 8,455 dowry deaths reported.89
As shocking as these figures are, they likely represent only a
fraction of the cases that actually occur.90 There are many women
who die and whose names are never brought to the police because the
matter is simply handled “privately.” A groom’s family might success-
fully cover up the crime, or convince the bride’s family not to pursue
charges.91 Some brides’ families lack the financial and psychological
81. RANJANA KUMARI, BRIDES ARE NOT FOR BURNING: DOWRY VICTIMS IN INDIA 25–26
(1989) (referencing in its bibliography articles which show the use of “bride burning” in
titles in the early 1980s, such as A.S.J. Andley, Acquittal Order in Bride Burning Case,
STATESMAN, Nov. 30, 1984; Chaitanya Kalbag, Bride Burning, Until Death Do Us Part,
INDIA TODAY, Jan. 27, 1982; and Ending Bride Burning, DECCAN HERALD, Aug. 9, 1983).
82. See, e.g., Two Crimes Against Women Reported Daily in Tripura, TIMES OF INDIA,
(Apr. 30, 2013), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/Two-crimes-against-wom
en-reported-daily-in-Tripura/articleshow/19776895.cms [http://perma.cc/L3H5-3CGJ].
83. Samuel, supra note 73, at 200, 208, 211.
84. See David Devadas, The Horror Spreads: Dowry Related Deaths Break Religious,
Caste and Geographical Barriers, INDIA TODAY (June 30, 1988, 1:45 PM), http://india
today.intoday.in/story/dowry-related-deaths-break-religous-caste-geographical-barriers
/1/329482.html [http://perma.cc/FZ8X-LK9C].
85. However, some states appear to exhibit slightly higher rates than others, as “[t]he
data suggests that the problem is concentrated in three states. Rajasthan has 60% of all
cases in India.” Sahil Bhalla, False Dowry Case Problem is Overblown, There Is Still One
Death Every Hour, SCROLL.IN (July 04, 2014, 7:55 AM), http://scroll.in/article/669073/False
-dowry-case-problemis-overblown,-there-is-still-one-death-every-hour [http://perma.cc
/CS3Z-UM3B].
86. NAT’L CRIME RECORDS BUREAU, CRIME IN INDIA 2012, at 58 (2013), http://ncrb
.nic.in/StatPublications/CII/CII2012/Compendium2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/PLL2-Y26A]
(noting that in 2012 there was a 20.7% increase in dowry deaths from the level re-
corded in 2002). Of course, India’s population has also increased dramatically over this
time period.
87. NAT’L CRIME RECORDS BUREAU, Chapter 5: Crime Against Women, in CRIME IN
INDIA 2000, at tbl. 5.1 (2002), http://ncrb.nic.in/StatPublications/CII/CII2000/CONTENTS
/CHAP5.DOC [http://perma.cc/EW3C-VV9E].
88. NAT’L CRIME RECORDS BUREAU, CRIME IN INDIA 2010, at 58 (2011), http://ncrb.nic
.in/StatPublication/CII/CII2010/Compendium2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z4SN-YGH5].
89. NAT’L CRIME RECORDS BUREAU, supra note 5, at tbl. 1.8.
90. See Jason Koutsoukis, India Burning Brides and Ancient Practice Is on the Rise,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Jan. 31, 2015, 12:15 AM), http://www.smh.com.au/world/india
-burning-brides-and-ancient-practice-is-on-the-rise-20150115-12r4j1.html [http://perma
.cc/XML2-CM9L] (estimating actual figures are three to four times the number of re-
ported cases).
91. See id.
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resources to pursue a case in India’s hopelessly backlogged system.92
Sometimes the police are inept, corrupt, or unconcerned, and charges
are never laid.93 In response, the Indian legislature enacted several
laws to deal with just this particular subset of gender violence.94
III. THE INDIAN LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE—PUNISHING PRACTICE
WHILE PRESERVING CULTURE
India’s laws criminalize the practice of dowry and harshly punish
violence associated with it.95 However, the laws function more to
operate within cultural constraints than to change them. Over the
past 50 years, India has enacted three major pieces of dowry vio-
lence legislation.96
A. The Dowry Prohibition Act of 196197
In 1961, Indian legislators passed the Dowry Prohibition Act.
The Act defined Dowry as:
any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given
either directly or indirectly—
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the
marriage; or
(b) by the persons of either party to a marriage or by any
other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other
person; at or before [or any time after the marriage] [as consider-
ation for the marriage of the said parties . . . .]98
The giving or taking of dowry was made punishable by fine or
incarceration.99 At present, the Act provides for a term of no less than
five years imprisonment and a fine of no less than fifteen thousand
92. Olga Khazan & Rama Lakshmi, 10 Reasons Why India Has a Sexual Violence
Problem, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews
/wp/2012/12/29/india-rape-victim-dies-sexual-violence-proble [http://perma.cc/NF8L-GAH7]
(indicating that one judge estimated India’s current backlog of criminal cases would take
466 years to clear even if no new cases were added to the books).
93. Bikshapathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Cr. A. No. 918 of 1988, at para. 21 (HC,
Andhra Pradesh Oct. 27, 1988).
94. See infra Part III.
95. See, e.g., V. K. DEWAN, THE DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961, at 185 (2000).
96. See Judith G. Greenberg, Criminalizing Dowry Deaths: The Indian Experience,
11 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 801, 807–08 (2003); see also DEWAN, supra note 95,
at 121–23.
97. PEN. CODE § 304B (1860) (amended 1986).
98. Id. (footnotes omitted). Note that this subsection was changed to “in connection
with” from “as consideration for” in 1984.
99. Id.
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rupees.100 Unfortunately, the incidence of dowry did not decline after
the Act was passed. Instead, the practice of dowry continued to spread
across castes, classes, and communities, becoming more and more
excessive. The 1961 provisions were largely ineffective because of
large loopholes and lax enforcement. The law exempted “gifts” as
they were technically not given in “consideration for the marriage,”
but the “gifts” simply became a euphemism for grand dowries.101
Families were encouraged to keep detailed logs of “gifts” to be used
as evidence in the event of a dispute or the dissolution of the mar-
riage, but this was cumbersome and felt unseemly.102 Though over
10 million weddings happen in India every year,103 and dowry plays
an integral part in most, prosecutions are rare.104 Grooms’ families
continue to demand money, and brides’ families continue to scrimp
and save to assure a good match.
B. Dowry Harassment and Cruelty: Section 498A105
In the 1980s, the Indian legislature amended the Indian Penal
Code to fully acknowledge, and specifically criminalize, dowry-related
violence. The first of these additions was Section 498A of the Indian
Penal Code:
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a
woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and
shall also be liable to fine. . . . [C]ruelty means
(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or
danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the
woman; or 
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with
a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also Dhananjay Mahapatra, Custody Payments, Gifts not Dowry: SC, TIMES
OF INDIA (Feb. 1, 2008, 12:35 AM), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Customary
-payments-gifts-not-dowry-SC/articleshow/2747113.cms [http://perma.cc/4E7S-DRWF].
102. Utkarsh Anand, Prepare List of Dowry Articles to Prove Claims: HC, INDIAN
EXPRESS (Feb. 27, 2011, 2:33 AM), http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/prepare-list-of
-dowry-articles-to-prove-claims-hc/755421 [http://perma.cc/Y2SQ-SWYU].
103. Sahiba Sachdev, The Flourishing Indian Wedding Industry, INDIAN RETAILER,
http://www.retail.franchiseindia.com/article/whats-hot/trends/The-Flourishing-Indian
-Wedding-Industry.a247 [http://perma.cc/E6TQ-3ZT7] (providing an overview of the wed-
ding industry in 2010).
104. See Supreme Court Expresses Anguish over Continuing Dowry Deaths, INFOCHANGE
INDIA, http://infochangeindia.org/women/news/supreme-court-expresses-anguish-over-con
tinuing-dowry-deaths.html [http://perma.cc/P2C4-6XDR] (reporting in 2009 that the Dowry
Prohibition Act is rarely enforced).
105. PEN. CODE § 498A (1983) (referred to colloquially as the “Anti-Cruelty Act).
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unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on
account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet
such demand.106
Section 498A was a monumental shift in the law. It was the first
legislative acknowledgment of domestic violence as a crime.107 Most
notably, Section 498A includes dowry harassment of any kind in the
definition of cruelty, identifying it as a particular form of domestic
violence. The law is very narrow though, and, aside from dowry mat-
ters, only criminalizes conduct so extreme it risks grave injury. None-
theless, it was a step forward because it recognized domestic violence.
Battering could previously have been prosecuted under the Indian
Penal Code provisions for assault and battery, but such prosecutions
were extremely rare.108
C. The Offense of Dowry Death: Section 304B
The third major legislative change was the insertion of Section
304B in 1986, creating the newly defined crime of dowry death:
Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily
injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances
within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon be-
fore her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her
husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with,
any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”,
and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused
her death.109
Section 304B was generally heralded as a feminist triumph.
Naming the phenomenon specifically, and creating a whole new cate-
gory of homicides, paved the way, it was thought, for new and favor-
able jurisprudence. Furthermore, it was felt that deeming provisions
responded to the evidentiary hurdles that typify dowry death cases,
106. Id.
107. CENTRE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, IPC SECTION 498A SEMINAR: A TOOL TO COMBAT
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 16 (2005), http://www.498a.org/contents/Publicity/CSRStudy_Final
SeminarReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/2FFS-R5XW].
108. See id. at 7; see also Bikshapathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh,Cr. A. 918 of 1988,
at para. 40 (HC, Andhra Pradesh Oct. 27, 1988) (acknowledging the social pressures that
prevented reporting).
109. PEN. CODE § 304B (1860) (amended 1986) (emphasis added). Note that dowry
death is a separate crime from murder. A prosecutor who feels the requirements of 304B
are lacking may choose to proceed with murder charges if the evidence is sufficient, but
convictions in such cases are rare. See LAW COMM’N OF INDIA, TWO HUNDRED AND SEC-
OND REPORT ON PROPOSAL TO AMEND SECTION 304-B OF INDIAN PENAL CODE, at 3 (2007).
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which frequently occur in the home where evidence is scant and
witnesses may all be complicit in the act.
Overall, the network of dowry death legislation appears positive
in terms of its appreciation of the problem. The language of the stat-
utes, and particularly the deeming provision of Section 304B, makes
it clear the legislature wants dowry deaths taken seriously. Even so,
the legislature anticipates the laws will operate within certain cul-
tural norms. Impliedly or by reference, all three laws acknowledge,
and largely accept, arranged marriage, the joint family system, and,
to some extent, even dowry itself. Unfortunately, these cultural norms
are not egalitarian. All of these practices presume, within the realm
of marriage and family, a hierarchy where woman are lower than
men. The unintended result is the encumbrance of the anti-dowry and
dowry violence measures. While the state criminalizes the ill-effects
on the one hand, it tacitly applauds the family structures and prac-
tices that render women unequal on the other.
The Dowry Prohibition Act, for instance, plainly refers to the
presence of family members in the marriage agreement,110 thus un-
questioningly accepting the tradition of arranged marriage.111 Ar-
ranged marriages remain the norm in India,112 despite increased
Westernization that prefers romantic love precede marriage.
110. The Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 28 of 1961, INDIA CODE (1961).
111. See Samuel, supra note 73, at 207–08. It is difficult to measure exactly how much
the practice of arranged marriage contributes to dowry death. In arranged marriages,
parents often allow social class and education to serve as proxies for “a good family.”
Focused on status and appearances and a desire to avoid the scandal that can come with
lengthy premarital courtships, some parents do not take the time to truly get to know the
other family. In such cases, post-wedding dowry harassment is a rude awakening. The
rate of dowry deaths in love marriages is lower than in arranged marriages. Id., at 208.
But even dowry-related violence is unlikely to cause Indians to abandon arranged mar-
riages, since such arrangements address numerous concerns about family traditions,
boundaries, and relations between the sexes and the social classes. See id., at 201.
112. See Indians Swear by Arranged Marriages, DECCAN HERALD (Mar. 2, 2013), http://
www.deccanherald.com/content/316016/indians-swear-arranged-marriages.html [http://
perma.cc/P3MK-P9D3]; see also Anjali Thakur, More Indians Prefer Arranged to Love
Marriages: Study, JAGRAN POST (Apr. 12, 2014, 9:41 AM), http://post.jagran.com/More-In
dians-prefer-arranged-to-love-marriages-Study-1397275884 [http://perma.cc/6S93-BR4F]
(supporting the proposition that regardless of faith or social class, most Indian families
believe that decisions like choosing a life partner are best made with the guidance of
elders); Giri Raj Gupta, Love, Arranged Marriage, and the Indian Social Structure, 7 J.
COMP. FAM. STUD. 82–83 (1976) (acknowledging that arranged marriages serve several
purposes). Proponents of arranged marriage point to the comparatively high rate of di-
vorce in countries like the United States that favor love marriage, versus India’s extremely
low rate of 1.1 percent. Rashmi Goel, Coaxing Culture: India’s Legislative Response to
Dowry Deaths, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER VIOLENCE: LESSONS LEARNED
FROM EFFORTS WORLDWIDE 99, 104 (Rashmi Goel & Leigh Goodmark eds., 2015). Ideally,
if parents have matched family styles and outlook, arranged marriage also reduces the
likelihood of marital discord. It expands the pool of potential partners to unknown indi-
viduals. This helps ensure marriage for almost everyone, including introvert and wall-
flower personalities who might otherwise not find a partner.
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Arranged marriages are not forced marriages. They function
more as facilitated first meetings between the potential groom and
the potential bride, with only limited time given to decide if the match
is acceptable. Parents today generally seek their child’s consent be-
fore agreeing to any alliance, but it is rare that any arranged mar-
riage would include anything akin to dating prior to the agreement
to marry.113 Courtships prior to any agreement are generally short.114
That said, arranged marriages definitely involve limiting choice and
autonomy. Because parents seek potential partners who have some-
thing in common, the arranged marriage market also reduces the
pool of potential partners to those who are most similar.115 It works
to preserve social group purity, so that parents consider only matches
of the same religion, caste, social status, etc.116 Women are given a
choice, but only within a select group.
Further, the arranged marriage market often includes double
standards for women. For instance, many grooms’ families will seek
a potential bride who is educated, because that demonstrates status,
but not one who desires a career, because that might imply she needs
to work to support the family and thus lower their status.117 Arranged
marriage preserves the economic power structure of traditional gen-
der roles, as in most cases, the bride will not work outside the home
at all after marriage. Even when the bride will be working outside
the home, parents generally seek a match in which the groom will
earn more than the bride.118 The state may push education and fi-
nancial independence for women in the public realm, but by accept-
ing arranged marriage they also accept that women are unequal in
the private realm, and particularly in the arena of marriage.119 There
is also some moral standing associated with an arranged marriage
over a love marriage.120 Even among those families that are “modern,”
liberal, and educated, arranged marriages are preferred as the mark
of a “good family.”121 The unwritten rules imply that love marriages
bring the risk of sexual indiscretion, and thus low morals.
Critics also argue that arranged marriages are largely about
social status.122 Brides seek to “marry up” and grooms seek to increase
113. See Gupta, supra note 112, at 78.
114. Id. at 79.
115. Id. at 78.
116. Id. at 80. This can intensify divisions between different economic, religious, cultural,
and linguistic traditions in an extremely diverse society.
117. Id. at 78.
118. Samuel, supra note 73, at 200.
119. See id. at 83.
120. Gupta, supra note 112, at 79.
121. See id. at 77.
122. See id. at 78.
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their assets, while at least maintaining their social standing. Any
dowry can demonstrate social status, but a generous dowry can ac-
tually change a groom’s social status. Negotiating a large dowry from
the bride’s parents is a way of climbing the economic ladder.123 In
other words, arranged marriages and dowry go hand in hand. Ac-
commodating arranged marriage as a social norm also accommodates
the Indian reality that marriage can be based upon finances rather
than affection.124 So long as the bride is viewed as a path to economic
enrichment rather than as a life partner, she is a commodity and
at risk.
Just as the Dowry Prohibition Act contemplates arranged mar-
riages by referring to parental involvement in dowry exchanges,
Section 498A and Section 304B accede to the joint family system by
reference to the actions of the husband’s relatives.125 The joint fam-
ily system entails several generations living under the same roof;
parents live with their sons, their daughters-in-law, their unmarried
daughters, and their sons’ children. Currently, twenty to thirty per-
cent of Indian families live in joint family homes.126 Under the best
circumstances, the joint family arrangement involves everyone liv-
ing together as one big happy family.127 Joint families also enjoy a
certain status that implies homespun, good old fashioned values.
The special dangers associated with this system, though, are
significant. Because the joint family home involves multiple people,
it also entails negotiating multiple relationships, expectations and
power dynamics.128 Although often romanticized, the joint family
system envisions a very definite power structure in which women are
lower in the family hierarchy than men. The system works, but only
if everyone acts according to their position and limitations. Daughters-
in-law are subject to the multiple hierarchies of age and economics.
They are the bottom of the power structure, subject to their parents-
in-law, other elders of the home and their husbands. New brides are
expected to adjust to a whole new set of household rules.129 They are
123. Samuel, supra note 73, at 198, 206.
124. Id. at 207.
125. PEN. CODE § 498A (1983); see also PEN. CODE § 304B (1860) (amended 1986).
126. Madhavi Rajadhyaksha, 56% More Joint Families in City than 10 Years Ago,
TIMES OF INDIA (Mar. 24, 2012), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/56-more
-joint-families-in-city-than-10-years-ago/articleshow/12386310.cms [http://perma.cc/GHP3
-JZPC]; see also P. Sunderarajan, Several States in North India Cling on to Joint Families,
THE HINDU (Mar. 16, 2012, 1:56 AM), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/several
-states-in-north-india-cling-on-to-joint-families/article2999837.ece [http://perma.cc/ECC5
-DBTK].
127. See Rajadhyaksha, supra note 126.
128. See Rastogi & Therly, supra note 11, at 73.
129. Id.
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usually forbidden from working outside the home,130 limiting their
economic power, and those women who do work outside the home
may invite criticism because they appear insufficiently devoted to
family.131 Instead of offering additional protection for a young bride,
the joint family system can create the conditions for abuse. In an al-
ready existing family structure, the new daughter-in-law is a relative
stranger. If she is cast as an outsider,132 it can promote collusion,
conspiracy, and ultimately, deadly violence.133 When dowry deaths
occur in joint family homes, family members, especially mothers-in-
law, are unavoidably implicated. Again, by accepting the joint fam-
ily system unqualifiedly, the state unwittingly hampers the efficacy
of its own legislation.
Even dowry appears widely tolerated in the Penal Code provi-
sions. Although the burden of proof is arguably reduced in dowry
violence and dowry death cases, easing prosecution is not the same
as increasing punishment. In fact, the sanction is not greater in
dowry violence cases than other domestic violence cases. As a result,
cases of dowry harassment and dowry death are punished no more
seriously than cases of cruelty and homicide without dowry.134
Dowry’s widespread persistence is thus simultaneously lamented
and conceded.135 Ultimately, the legislation functions more to regu-
late dowry in family violence than to eradicate it.
In the end, dowry, arranged marriage, and the joint family sys-
tem are presented as immutable features of Indian society. All of
these practices however include an implicit gender hierarchy in
which women are less than men, women’s choices are limited and
these practices are simultaneously cast as good. Although the state
may accept the advancement of women in the public realm, married
life is viewed as rightly limiting. A young female college graduate
with opportunities trades her freedom in for marriage where she is
first given limited choice as to a partner, and then moves on to live
in a household where she is subject to the will of a husband and male
and female elders. Worse yet, these are all the mark of a “good family”
and social success. For the Indian woman then, the culmination of
130. See Ghafour, supra note 8.
131. See Rew, Gangoli & Gill, supra note 3, at 152.
132. Rastogi & Therly, supra note 11, at 71 (explaining that older women often align
themselves against new female family members).
133. Rew, Gangoli & Gill, supra note 3, at 147; see also Samuel, supra note 73, at 210.
134. U.N. Women, Criminal Sanctions and Sentencing Provisions, http://www.endvaw
now.org/en/articles/829-criminal-sanctions-and-sentencing-provisions-.html?next=830
[http://perma.cc/KBN2-E8EJ].
135. The Dowry Prohibition Act is woefully unenforced; only 10,050 violations of the
Dowry Prohibition Act were reported in 2014 for all of India. NAT’L CRIME RECORDS
BUREAU, supra note 5, at tbl. 1.12.
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her life, i.e., becoming a married woman, is a stage of limitation and
constraint, if not outright subjugation. Whatever their merits might
be, these structures maintain patriarchy in the domestic sphere. In
extreme cases, they form a deadly trifecta for a new bride. Accepting
practices like arranged marriage and the joint family system, with-
out also acknowledging their harms, ultimately sets the stage for
women’s subjugation in the home.
It is useful also to consider these practices in the Indian historical
and political context. As with most post-colonial nations, India post-
independence entails rediscovering the pre-colonial identity, even
imagining the country would have been better off without British
rule and intervention. The process of rediscovering roots often in-
volves a cultural retrenchment then as an anti-colonial act.136 Con-
sider for example Mahatma Gandhi’s appeal during the campaign
for independence to the people of India to wear only homespun cloth,
instead for buying cloth from the British textile mills.137 Of course
it was an economic act, but it was also an act to inspire pride and
self-sufficiency in Indians. This return to the homespun is not lim-
ited to the economic realm. It is equally, if not more, present in the
philosophical realm. Once dowry, arranged marriage and the joint
family system are cast as “traditions,” continuing those traditions
is a kind of anti-colonial act, a way of asserting that the old Indian
ways are the best ways.138
This kind of thinking is evident even in the arguments sur-
rounding dowry on the legislative floor in 1960, and the way it is
presented today even in Supreme Court judgments. That is, the In-
dian judiciary has denounced current dowry practice as different,
capitalism-infused and worse than the tradition of old. The alleged
original value and purpose of the custom, in a simpler time, is as-
serted even as it is begrudgingly abandoned, or maintained as the
case may be. Similarly, although arranged marriage and the joint
family system create obvious dangers and diminish the status of
women, they are retained as positive Indian cultural traditions, and
indications of a good family. For a woman to be considered “from a
good family” or “worthy of a good family” she must be willing to ac-
cept this kind of diminished status. The social fabric creates a false
dichotomy between women’s rights and good moral character or so-
cial success. Not only is there little shame in accepting women as
136. S Raju, The Issues at Stake: An Overview of Gender Concerns in Post-Independence
India, 29 ENV’T & PLAN. A 2191, 2191–93 (1997). 
137. Theodore M. Brown & Elizabeth Fee, Spinning For India’s Independence, 98 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 39, 39 (2008).
138. See Raju, supra note 136, at 2193–94.
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inferior, it is almost a mark of pride. It can easily be spun as being
a bit old-fashioned, and preserving culture. A family can be both
liberal and traditional in this way. Some of the most progressive and
successful families in India have joint family living arrangements
and expect arranged marriages.139 They will educate their daughters
to show they are not backwards, but still insist that the daughter
must marry and have a family, as opposed to a career, as the achieve-
ment of adulthood.140 There is simply no expectation, in the courts
or in the legislatures, that equality is a necessary part of the mar-
ital experience.
The Indian laws punish dowry and dowry violence, but they
stop short of critiquing the practices that promote female inferiority
to enable those crimes. Admittedly, the legislature must be wary of
intruding too deeply into cultural traditions and the intimate spaces
of family customs—laws that push for significant change in the
private sphere often invite backlash—but here the legislature leaves
these aspects of cultural change to the slow shift of hearts and minds,
without the benefit of any legislative boost.
The legislative scheme fails to appreciate the robust connection
between these practices and dowry, and fails to appreciate the po-
sition of dowry violence within a network of patriarchal practices
that encourage the subjugation of women more generally. Instead,
the legislative scheme assumes the motive for dowry related violence
to be greed. The laws and judgments speak to the financial motiva-
tions. But the dowry deaths are only a symptom of an underlying
system that accepts the inferior position of women within marriage
as a given. The end result is that the provisions punish the harm
done to women, but do nothing to address the power structures or
systems of patriarchy by which women are put in harm’s way in the
first place.
IV. ANSWERING WHY
A. The Hurdle of Section 304B
It is a maxim of criminal law that people should be punished
according to their moral blameworthiness.141 For this reason, women
who kill in self-defense are not culpable, because what they have done
is justifiable and they are not morally blameworthy.142 Similarly,
139. Ghafour, supra note 8.
140. Id.
141. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 15 (5th ed. 2010).
142. See id. at 17.
2016] WOMEN WHO KILL WOMEN 569
women who kill while legally insane are excused because they do
not understand what they are doing and are not responsible for their
actions.143 In either case, correctly assessing culpability requires ask-
ing why the offender acted as she did.
Section 304B is vulnerable to critique in part because it presumes
the “why” is dowry greed, but precludes any inquiry to confirm it.
Under the deeming provisions of Section 304B, the prosecution needs
to establish only that the victim died of unnatural causes within
seven years of marriage and that she was subject to dowry harass-
ment shortly before her death;144 there is no need to prove the defen-
dants’ mental state at the time of the acts that caused the death, or
even that the defendants actually caused the death at all. Techni-
cally, any “unnatural” death that occurred shortly after dowry harass-
ment could qualify as a dowry death and garner a conviction. This
might seem outrageous, but the Indian dowry death provisions ac-
tually function similarly to American felony murder rules. Under
the felony murder rule, a defendant who, while committing an enu-
merated felony, causes a death, intentionally, recklessly, negligently,
or even accidentally, will be held strictly liable for that death as
a murder.145 
The American felony murder rule has received significant crit-
icism for its breadth and its strict liability application.146 It has long
ago been abandoned in other parts of the world, including India.147
Here in the United States, scholars and judges have criticized it
for ignoring the fundamental principle that the defendant’s mental
state as to the harm caused is an essential measure of criminal
culpability.148
Some have likewise criticized the deeming provisions of Sec-
tion 304B for ignoring the accused’s mental state as to the death of
143. Id. at 391.
144. PEN. CODE § 304B (1860) (amended 1986).
145. See LAFAVE, supra note 141, at 786, 801–02.
146. See id. at 785–86. See also Robert Mauldin Elliot, Comment, The Merger Doctrine
as a Limitation on the Felony Murder Rule: A Balance of Criminal Law Principles, 13
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 369, 371 (1977) (contending that “the rule does violence to the
philosophy which dictates that criminal liability should be commensurate with moral
culpability”); Jeanne H. Seibold, The Felony Murder Rule: In Search of a Viable Doctrine,
23 CATH. LAW. 133, 160–61 (1978) (arguing that the rule is “grossly misplaced in a legal
system which recognizes the degree of mental culpability as the appropriate standard
for fixing criminal liability”).
147. Time to Do Away with the Felony Murder Rule, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 23, 2008,
2:48 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/time-felony-murder-rule-article-1.358
242 [http://perma.cc/LGN3-9DTY].
148. See Timothy P. O’Neill, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, It’s Felony Murder, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL. (Aug. 11, 2006), http://www.jmls.edu/directory/profiles/oneill-timothy/pdfs/20060811
-cdlb-oneill.pdf [http://perma.cc/PJ66-66GP].
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the victim.149 Essentially, the basic inquiry into the mental state of
the defendant is lost. The law infers from the dowry harassment that
the motivation for the killing must have been avarice, but it does
not actually require that motivation be proven.
Furthermore, Section 304B significantly reduces the burden on
police and prosecutors to achieve a conviction by way of its deeming
provisions. Proponents of the deeming provisions argue they are
necessary to counter the biases of police and judges that often leave
dowry deaths ignored and prosecutions unsuccessful.150 Ancillary
laws were also amended to counter bias. For instance, Section 174
of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code now requires police to order
a postmortem even in cases of suicide of a woman within seven years
of marriage.151 Even the Evidence Act was amended to overcome the
general reluctance of courts to deal with these crimes, essentially
restating the presumption of Section 304B:
When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry
death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such
woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harass-
ment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court
shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.152
In at least one case, the husband was not even physically present at
the time of the killing, but the court found him culpable nonethe-
less, courtesy of the deeming provisions.153
Section 304B is thus praised as a pragmatic response to the
formidable challenges of prosecution and proof in dowry death cases.
Physical evidence,154 and testimonial evidence, is often very limited,155
frequently because the death occurred in a private home and residents
149. PHYLLIS CHESLER, WOMAN’S INHUMANITY TO WOMAN 43 (2001).
150. Amartya Talukdar, IPC 498A, Dowry & Dowry Deaths, SADDAHAQ (July 8, 2015,
12:24 PM) http://www.saddahaq.com/ipc-498a-dowry-dowry-deaths [http://perma.cc/9LWR
-VTKK].
151. The Code of Criminal Procedure, INDIA CODE § 174 (1973).
152. PEN. CODE § 304B (1860) (amended 1986) (emphasis added).
153. See What Constitutes the Offence of Dowry Death, LEGAL ASPIRATION (Dec. 7, 2015),
http://www.lawkam.org/criminal/what-constitutes-the-offence-of-dowry-death/6094
[http://perma.cc/UAY5-2PVA].
154. Rew, Gangoli & Gill, supra note 3, at 155 (referring to the destruction of evidence
that often occurs as a result of immolation).
155. Bikshapathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Cr. A. No. 918 of 1988, at para. 26 (HC,
Andhra Pradesh Oct. 27, 1988); Subrahmanyam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 2 SCR
666, para. 3.02 (quoting where the India Supreme Court expresses anguish over continu-
ing dowry deaths); Chandrasekaran v. State, Cr. A No. 1161 of 2000, para. 48 (HC Mad.,
Aug. 20, 2003).
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are complicit in the murder.156 Even where evidence exists, police are
often poorly trained and biased.157 Police may not take a case seri-
ously because they consider it a private matter and may not perform
a rigorous investigation.158 Police are also susceptible to corruption
and can be bribed so that they do not investigate thoroughly, ques-
tion witnesses, or collect evidence properly.159 Families will pay to
avoid the stigma of a charge, and when police are paid to look the
other way, they often do.160 By eliminating the need for causal proof,
Section 304B removes many of the evidentiary difficulties that plague
dowry death prosecutions.
Ironically though, this strict liability approach, intended to end
dowry deaths and raise the status of women overall, could be det-
rimental to women in the long run. Because the law does not even
contemplate inquiry into the real reasons behind the killing, other
factors aside from dowry are never investigated. Section 304B’s
deeming provisions effectively make dowry practice the scapegoat,
selecting it as the lynchpin and source of all violence in these cases.
This is not to suggest that dowry plays no role, but selecting dowry
as the sole motivator distracts us from a deeper interrogation of
other causal factors. Dowry is merely the obvious evil, while other
patriarchal practices that place women at risk are quietly dis-
counted or overlooked.
This effect is sadly evident in the dowry death jurisprudence.
Judges do not speculate on the reasons dowry deaths occur beyond
the theory of dowry greed. Even the strange participation of mothers-
in-law in dowry deaths has not provoked conjecture.
B. Beyond Greed
The real reasons for women’s participation in these murders are
likely much more complex than simple greed, but what does cause
women to participate in such violence against other women? Social
science scholars have offered several theories to explain why women
156. Sometimes, there is not even a corpse, because it is customary to cremate or bury
the dead quickly after death. See Singh v. State of Punjab, Cr. A. No. 510 of 2007, para. 8
(SC July 3, 2013) (noting that the in-laws cremated the body of the victim before her
parents could arrive).
157. Rehan Abeyratne & Dipika Jain, Domestic Violence Legislation in India: The
Pitfalls of a Human Rights Approach to Gender Equality, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC.
POL’Y & L. 333, 351–52 (2013).
158. Id.
159. Sujata Gadkar-Wilcox, Intersectionality and the Under-Enforcement of Domestic
Violence Laws in India, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 455, 468 (2012).
160. See Abeyratne & Jain, supra note 157, at 338.
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might act as agents in their own oppression and the oppression of
other women.
1. Internalized Patriarchy
Some suggest that Indian mothers-in-law, and other women
who oppress women, do so because they have internalized the patri-
archal values of their society.161 Internalized patriarchy theory,162
contends that when women are consistently devalued in society they
begin to devalue themselves,163 and other women similarly. In other
words, the mother-in-law who abuses her daughter-in-law does so
because she truly feels that women should not hold power or status
in society. She may hold herself similarly to have little value. Some
surveys of Indian women reveal that many believe they deserve to
be beaten, and they claim fault for the abuse.164
A mother-in-law who is controlled by her male family members,
and has internalized the values that reduce women’s status, will
comply with the rules of the patriarchal system. Her long-suffering
life is her badge of honor and compliance in this system. Furthermore,
because women are punished for defying the patriarchal system, or
even working outside the system, they learn to police the behavior of
other women accordingly. The mother-in-law becomes another force
of patriarchy, abiding by, and enforcing, the rules of that society.
2. Patriarchal Bargain
Another theory, the patriarchal bargain, asserts that mothers-
in-law have struck a sort of bargain with the system: if they comply
with the rules of patriarchy, eventually, they will be rewarded with
power and privileges within that system.165
In the family context, the mother-in-law has already spent her
time as a daughter-in-law, perhaps suffering indignities at the hands
of her own mother-in-law.166 For years she must have managed the
161. Rew, Gangoli & Gill, supra note 3, at 147.
162. Internalization has also been suggested as a way to explain why some people of
color feel prejudice against people of their own racial group.
163. Fernandez, supra note 10, at 439.
164. See NANDA PRIYA ET AL., INT’L CTR. RES. ON WOMEN, STUDY ON MASCULINITY,
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND SON PREFERENCE IN INDIA, 28 (2014), http://www.icrw
.org/sites/default/files/publications/Masculinity%20Book_Inside_final_6th%20Nov.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5FTX-9MBQ].
165. Deniz Kandiyoti, Bargaining with Patriarchy, 2 GENDER & SOC’Y 274–75, 279
(1988).
166. See Rastogi & Therly, supra note 11, at 72.
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household, under her own mother-in-law’s strict guidance, having
given up her own natal family, and moving to a home of strangers,
most likely through an arranged marriage.167 She might have sacri-
ficed dreams of a career or personal ambition. Her status as a mother-
in-law has been earned by her own life of sacrifices and struggles.
The mother-in-law has waited for this day for a long time and she
expects her due reward. When it does not come in the form of a duti-
ful daughter-in-law,168 she feels cheated and righteously angry. The
daughter-in-law is supposed to serve her mother-in-law, and give her
respite from the daily drudgery of household tasks. Daughters-in-law
who do not conform to the patriarchal ideals of the role risk the ire
of the mother-in-law because they are not participating in the bar-
gain. Criticisms often take the form of “this generation” complaints,169
like “this generation is too modern”; “this generation of girls values
independence over family”; and “girls nowadays do not know how to
adjust; they just want everything their own way.” Such complaints
demonstrate an overarching alignment with the patriarchal aim of
restricting younger women’s freedoms. It is often regarded as mere
conservatism or orthodoxy, but at root such old-school thinking is
about preserving power structures.
Similarly, the mother-in-law’s status is gained by being the
mother of a son.170 Her power over another woman, her daughter-in-
law, is a result of her having given birth to a son. In this way also,
the mother-in-law has struck a bargain with the system. She enjoys
elevated status being the mother of a son, so it benefits her to elevate
sons (males) overall. Her complicity with a system that values boys
over girls, and sons over daughters, inures to her benefit. Therefore,
the mother-in-law has a vested interest in ensuring that a system
that values her status as the mother of a son continues. Because her
access to power and control over her own life and surroundings is
through her son, she would also want to ensure her control over her
son is complete, and not diluted or divided by his wife, her daughter-
in-law.171 A daughter-in-law who demands independent rights over
her husband is disrespecting her mother-in-law’s primary right over
the same man.172
167. Rew, Gangoli & Gill, supra note 3, at 152.
168. Kandiyoti, supra note 165, at 279.
169. See Adam Roberts, Curse of the Mummyji, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 21, 2013), http://
www.economist.com/news/christmas-specials/21591745-curse-mummyji [http://perma.cc
/5T68-G9W3].
170. See Rastogi & Therly, supra note 11, at 72.
171. Rew, Gangoli & Gill, supra note 3, at 153.
172. Rastogi & Therly, supra note 11, at 72 (citing R. Jethmalani & S. Prasad, Inter-
nalizing Patriarchy, in KALI’S YUG: EMPOWERMENT, LAW AND DOWRY DEATHS 139–47 (R.
Jethmalani ed., 1995)).
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The patriarchal bargain theory allows for varying degrees of
complex negotiation within the patriarchal framework.173 Women
(mothers-in-law) may police other women’s (daughters-in-law) behav-
ior to a greater or lesser degree, depending upon their own degree
of autonomy and dependence on the bargain. Physical control and
abuse of the daughters-in-law can be understood as a manifestation
of this policing, bringing the daughter-in-law in line with the expec-
tations of the patriarchal structure.
3. Limited Opportunities to Exercise Power
Some theorists suggest that senior women in the household
oppress junior women in the household because it is the only oppor-
tunity for power available to them.174 In other words, because women
in the home are so socially constrained, exercising power over the
daughter-in-law is the only outlet. The mother-in-law has power over
younger females in the house, but she is otherwise subject to the
rules of patriarchy and class that affect all women. What she wears,
where she goes, to whom she speaks, and what she does in her spare
time are all dictated by social and religious mores. She may still have
the responsibility of arranging the marriages of other children, and
of course she has the obligation to present the best public face of her
marital family. She must still uphold the honor of the family, and
manage everything with a firm hand, including the training of the
new daughter-in-law.175 People will blame her if her daughter-in-law
is unruly,176 or if the match or dowry is beneath their station. She
must also ensure that her son remains close and loyal to his par-
ents. Furthermore, her new status as a mother-in-law rekindles her
obligations as keeper of family traditions.177 This may cause a re-
trenchment of sorts, a return to an imagined era of conservatism,178
even if she was never a part of it. These limitations may be even
more suffocating if she is also subject to male authority in the house.
Within the Indian family structure however, age and status
allow the mother-in-law a limited opportunity to exercise power over
her junior, the daughter-in-law. The desire to exercise power some-
where and somehow, even over another woman, is strong. Thus,
dominating junior women in the home is a rare opportunity to ex-
ercise power in a world that affords few opportunities to do so.
173. Kandiyoti, supra note 165, at 278–79.
174. See Roberts, supra note 169; see also Ghafour, supra note 8.
175. See Rew, Gangoli & Gill, supra note 3, at 154.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
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4. Individual Agency and Autonomy
Finally, some argue that women abuse other women simply
because they choose to. Feminist professor Phyllis Chesler argues
that attributing such acts to the influences of patriarchy essentially
infantilizes women, and renders them less than fully human.179 If
we are to respect women as human beings capable of making choices,
Chesler asserts, we must recognize their full agency in the choices
they make. Under this theory, the mothers-in-law who abuse and
kill their daughters-in-law do so because they are angry, greedy,
and power hungry. They abuse and kill the daughters-in-law because
they can, and even because they want to. They are fully responsible
for their actions, and for their deviance from feminine norms.
Furthermore, the fact that the acts are extremely violent does
not categorically remove them from the feminine norm; the spectrum
of violence, Chesler argues, is the same for all human beings.180 The
fact that women exercise their capacity for extreme violence more
rarely than men does not mean that the spectrum does not extend
to it. Instead, women are just as capable as men of extreme violence,
and they commit violence with just as much individual autonomy
and agency as men do.181
Predictably, the individual agency theory is most consistent
with the application of the criminal law. In fact, the legitimacy of
criminal law rests almost entirely on a theory of individual agency
and autonomy. Eighteenth century philosopher Immanuel Kant fa-
mously expounded upon this theory in his treatise The Metaphysic
of Morals,182 as a basis for his theory of punishment. Essentially, the
capacity to know (or will) the moral choice, divorced from want and
desire, is the essence of autonomy.183 When one violates the law, one
makes a choice, and thus is properly subject to punishment. The con-
siderations that go into making that choice do not affect your capacity
to make the choice—they just affect the choice you make, and there-
fore they play no role in reducing your culpability. Kant concluded
that punishing the criminal for violating the law was an essential
demonstration of respect for and recognition of the criminal’s exer-
cise of autonomy.184 Similarly, Chesler suggests that acknowledging
179. See CHESLER, supra note 149, at 67; see also MORRISSEY, supra note 54, at 17.
180. CHESLER, supra note 149, at 67–68.
181. Id. at 35, 39.
182. EMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN [METAPHYSIC OF MORALS] 105 (English
Translation 1799); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
31–32 (Jonathan Bennett ed., 2008) (1785).
183. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 36–37.
184. IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 105.
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the woman’s choice to act violently is the inevitable consequence of
recognizing woman’s full humanity.185
Criminal law relies fundamentally on this minimalist notion of
autonomy—i.e., that autonomy is realized in the choosing. From a
law and order perspective, this theory is much more practical. It ex-
tends moral responsibility to all, and relieves people of culpability
only when the conduct is justified (morally right) or when the person
lacks the capacity to choose.186
But Kant’s theory of autonomy has been criticized for being
atomistic, and ignoring the basic operation of human society, which
is relational.187 Furthermore, it privileges the rational or intellectual
to the absolute exclusion of the emotional. Not only does this fail to
recognize the lived human experience, which includes emotions, it
operates to elevate men, who historically have been considered more
capable of reason and less subject to the “emotional weaknesses” of
the fairer sex.188
Alternatively, feminists have posited several theories of auton-
omy that take into account the relational experience of women.189
These theories are important in attempting to answer the difficult
question of agency when women appear to act against their own in-
terests or the interests of women in general, as in when they partici-
pate in oppressive practices like dowry. Since choice has been the
central characteristic of autonomy, the theories have focused on the
ways in which that choice is affected. Marilyn Friedman stated “when
an agent chooses or acts in accord with wants or desires that she has
self-reflectively endorsed, then she is autonomous.”190 Accordingly,
when one is not able to choose what one truly wants because of ex-
ternal constraints, then she is not autonomous, even though she
makes a choice. Relational factors that constrain a woman’s freedom
to choose, or limit the areas in which she can exercise choice, thus
limit autonomy.191 In that same vein, Diane Meyers suggested that
the capacity to reflect could itself be impaired through cultural
forces.192 Women might be incapable of recognizing the things that
185. CHESLER, supra note 149, at 67–68.
186. See LAFAVE, supra note 141, at 8–9, 16.
187. See Natalie Stoljar, Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHIL. (May 2, 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-autonomy/#PraOpp [http://
perma.cc/R7N2-483W].
188. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, in APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN’S LIVES: SEX, VIOLENCE, WORK, AND REPRODUCTION 37, 46–47
(D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996).
189. Stoljar, supra note 187.
190. See id. (citation omitted).
191. See id.
192. Id. (citation omitted).
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are doing harm to them and the things that would benefit them,
because of cultural forces that prevent women from learning how to
think for themselves. Meyer calls the ability to recognize those con-
ditions “autonomy competency.”193 These feminist conceptions of au-
tonomy allow for a diversity of individual choices, while still making
room to consider the degree that cultural and relational factors limit
women’s capacity to consider and execute choices.
Under Kant’s (and Chesler’s) minimalist autonomy theory, the
reasons a mother-in-law might act to further the patriarchal power
structure—internalized oppression, bargain, or limited opportunity
to exercise power—hardly matter. She has complete autonomy and
therefore is fully responsible for her choice. Under this theory, dowry
deaths result from the moral failures of individuals, and not a socie-
tal failure to value and protect women.
In contrast, under the relational theory of autonomy, we can
take into account the factors that motivate women’s participation in
patriarchy. These provide a more nuanced view of women’s motiva-
tions in dowry death cases, and reveal the forces which might drive
a mother-in-law to be complicit with patriarchal systems. Accepting
these theories does not mean that women should be excused for their
participation in these crimes, but it does mean recognizing that their
capacity for autonomy can be impinged by societal factors. Under
these theories then, society bears some responsibility for the condi-
tions under which women choose. Technically, neither of these theo-
ries prevents women from choosing to participate in practices that
oppress other women, or from choosing subservience for herself, if
she is making a truly free choice.
Some social scientists have dismissed such analyses, arguing
that any of these theories only explains what might drive a woman
to participate in the power structure that oppresses other women,
and not what might drive a woman to kill.194 This, I submit, is a false
question. In any society, there will always be those who violate the
rules to the extreme. We can never know what will drive one man—
or woman—to kill over money, and another refrain. We do know that
in a system of oppression, there will always be degrees of oppression.
In a system where the societal status of a daughter-in-law is inferior,
there will be a large number of women who are verbally abused by
their mothers-in-law. There will also be a proportion, though smaller,
who are physically abused by their mothers-in-law. There will also
be some who are killed by their mothers-in-law. The “why” simply
193. Id.
194. Id.
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cannot be answered by looking at the top point, the extreme edge,
and the small proportion of cases in which killing occurred. To under-
stand why the women kill other women, we need to look to the condi-
tions that made it possible for them to view women as inferior, and
ultimately expendable.
V. GOING FORWARD—DON’T COUNT ON THE COURTS
Over the past forty years, Indian courts have adjudicated hun-
dreds of dowry death cases. Judges lament the steady stream of
cases, and the deplorable facts that come to light in each.195 Judges
also appear frustrated that even the harshest sentences have had
little effect in curbing the phenomenon.196 One might, given the crim-
inal law approach of the legislature, put faith in the courts in the
drive to eradicate dowry deaths. After all, the Justices of the Indian
Supreme Court are especially cognizant of their dual role in apply
the law and promoting social change.197 Unfortunately, such faith
would be misplaced. Like the legislature, the courts have not looked
beyond the accepted motive of dowry greed for reasons, and like the
legislation, they appear bound to the patriarchal practices under the
guise of tradition.
Because dowry deaths are specifically located in the marital
relationship, the Supreme Court’s comments on women, marriage
and family may nonetheless prove instructive. Although the burden
of effecting change in this context is decidedly heavy, it has not pre-
vented the courts from commenting on the status of women in India
and the long road ahead. Consider the ways in which the court opines
about marriage at length in State (Delhi) v. Laxman Kumar:
Every marriage ordinarily involves a transplant. A girl born
and brought up in her natural family when given in marriage,
has to leave the natural setting and come into a new family. . . .
In the growing years in the natural setting the girl—now a
bride—has formed her own habits, gathered her own impres-
sions, developed her own aptitudes and got used to a way of life.
195. See Jasvinder Saini v. State Delhi, Cr. A. No. 819 of 2013, at para. 5 (SC
July 2, 2013).
196. J. Venkatesan, Dowry Killings Deserve Death Penalty: Supreme Court, THE
HINDU (Nov. 1, 2010, 3:20 AM), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/dowry-killings
-deserve-death-penalty-supreme-court/article861624.ece [http://perma.cc/SFX9-ZTNU].
197. The Supreme Court remarked here: “It is our considered opinion that this Court
has obligation within reasonable limits and justifying bounds to provide food for thoughts
which may help generate the proper social order and hold the community in an even
form.” State Delhi v. Laxman Kumar, (1985) 2 SCR 898.
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In the new setting some of these have to be accepted and some
she has to surrender. This process of adaptation is not and can-
not be one-sided. Give and take, live and let live, are the ways of
life and when the bride is received in the new family she must
have a feeling of welcome and by the fond bonds of love and af-
fection, grace and generosity, attachment and consideration that
she may receive in the family of the husband, she will get into a
new mould; the mould which would last for her life. She has to
get used to a new set of relationships—one type with the hus-
band, another with the parents-in-law, a different one with the
other superiors and yet a different one with the younger ones in
the family. For this she would require loving guidance. The elders
in the family, including the mother-in-law, are expected to show
her the way. The husband has to stand as a mountain of support
ready to protect her and espouse her cause where she is on the
right and equally ready to cover her either by pulling her up to
protecting her willingly taking the responsibility on to himself
when she is at fault. The process has to be a natural one and
there has to be exhibition of cooperation and willingness from
every side. Otherwise how would the transplant succeed[?]198
This passage is often quoted in other dowry violence cases.199
Like the dowry violence legislative provisions themselves, this rosy
picture of married life reveals a conservative view of family relations:
brides are expected to adjust, and are subject to their elders; mothers-
in-law must be loving, generous and nurturing; husbands must be
strong (and ultimately side with their wives).
This depiction casts women within a deeply conservative ideal.
Even if the ideal appears unrealistic, it is comfortably ensconced in
our collective unconscious. The mother-in-law who serves as a loving
guide to an innocent young bride in need of care, evokes the univer-
sal image of the Mother,200 who represents unconditional love.
198. Id. at 934–35.
199. Multiple cases reference similar language in varying forms; example include
Paniben v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCR 197 and Rathi v. State of Maharashtra, (1992)
Crim LJ (HC Bombay) 2106 (1991).
200. The three archetypes of womanhood—the Maiden, the Mother, and the Crone—
were long ago posited by Carl Jung. See Ruth E. Ray, Toward the Croning of Feminist
Gerontology, 18 J. AGING STUD. 109, 111 (2004). Archetypes are universal archaic images
and motifs derived from our collective unconscious. They transcend social, cultural and
temporal boundaries. Jung asserted that the female archetypes, present and persistent
in literature, religion and social structure, helped to account for the experiences and psy-
chology of women. Id. Archetypes also influence the way we interpret women’s experi-
ences and actions. I refer to these archetypes not to subscribe to a particular world-view,
but to utilize them as a convenient shorthand for the most common conceptions of woman-
hood worldwide. According to Jung, a woman passes naturally from one stage to the next
in her life, each representing her essential qualities and experiences. Id. Applying Jungian
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Though influenced and augmented by the particular manifesta-
tions of Woman in Indian history, literature and religion (primarily
Hindu mythology), the core attributes and characteristics of Jung’s
classic archetypes remain essentially unchanged in their Indian av-
atars. The Indian image of the Mother is the embodiment of love. She
is ever patient. She dotes on her children well into their adult lives.
An Indian mother never puts her own comfort over that of her chil-
dren, and works tirelessly for their benefit. She is self-sacrificing to
a fault.201 Even the nation is referred to as Mother India.202 Mothers
and motherhood hold a central place in Indian culture and society.
It is not surprising, then, that this ideal has found its way into
legal pronouncements describing what a mother, and by extension
a mother-in-law, should be. The mothers-in-law involved in dowry
violence are held to these standards. Not only held culpable under
the law, these women are held doubly blameworthy for their gross
departure from the Mother(-in-law) ideal.203 Women’s violent con-
duct is perceived as worse because the deviation from the inherently
benevolent feminine ideal is that much greater.
In contrast, because they expect men to be violent, courts are
more likely to tolerate violence from men.204 Husbands in dowry vio-
lence cases are given lesser sentences, and often receive bail, while
their mothers sit in jail.205 Sometimes the men are even partially
excused for their actions.206 Consider how the court’s language below
theory, “[t]he Maiden represents the purity and innocence of childhood . . . .” Female
Archetypes, SCHOOL MODERN PSYCHOLOGY, http://www.schoolofmodernpsychology.com
.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Female-Archetypes.pdf [http://perma.cc/AZ54-LAT4].
Next comes the Mother. Id. The Mother is the giver of life. Id. She provides sustenance
and can be self-sacrificing to deliver it. Id. She nurtures and comforts and cares for all
things and all children. Id. She represents unconditional love. Id. In many ways, because
of her life-giving ability, she is the culmination of womanhood. The last archetype, the
Crone, is the old woman. Id. She represents the knowledge of the earth and the experi-
ence of all the stages before. Id. She is patient and wise. Id.
201. Consider one story of the Hindu Goddess Kali, also called the Universal Mother.
Though she might initially appear as the most antiwoman example because of her destruc-
tive persona, she is also known for feeding her children with her own blood to sate their
hunger and thirst. See Wendy Doniger, Kali, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://britannica
.com/topic/Kali [http://perma.cc/5Y3Y-8M7N].
202. Translation of Bharat Mata is Mother India.
203. See, e.g., Lichhamadevi v. State of Rajasthan, (1988) 4 SCC 456 (India); see
also MORRISSEY, supra note 54, at 156 (referring to the feminist construction of the Nur-
turing Woman).
204. See MORRISSEY, supra note 54, at 17, 46.
205. See Tim Sullivan, Attacks on Brides Rise with Dowry Demands, L.A. TIMES
(July 25, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jul/25/news/adfg-dowry25 [http://perma
.cc/4KFG-C8RG].
206. Bikshapathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Cr. A. No. 918 of 1986, at para. 53 (HC,
Andhra Pradesh Oct. 27, 1988) (describing the defendant husband as being under the
influence of his mother).
2016] WOMEN WHO KILL WOMEN 581
ultimately shifts the blame onto the mother-in-law, even as it pretends
to castigate the husband:
It is more disturbing and sad that in most of such reported cases
it is the woman who plays a pivotal role in this crime against the
younger woman, as in this case, with the husband either acting
as a mute spectator or even an active participant in the crime, in
utter disregard of his matrimonial obligations. In many cases, it
has been noticed that the husband, even after marriage, contin-
ues to be ‘Mamma’s baby[’] and the umbilical cord appears not
to have been cut even at that stage.207
Resorting to a feminine ideal as a standard affects daughters-
in-law negatively too. The Maiden archetype emphasizes innocence.
As Maidens, new brides are expected to be submissive and wide-
eyed, with little knowledge of the world. The ideal daughter-in-law
is based on Sita,208 the long-suffering wife of Lord Ram, who withstood
fourteen years of exile in the forest and never uttered a word of com-
plaint. Educated women with careers and experience are therefore
less suitable as daughters-in-law. Women with expectations who
speak their minds are also less suitable as daughters-in-law. They
will have to change their ways and adjusting to the marital home will
be that much harder. By endorsing the idealized models of women
and marital relationships, the courts effectively pigeonhole all
women into conformist subordinate roles. Variance from these ideals
is then blameworthy in the public sphere. Women become further
constrained as orthodoxy is dressed up as “tradition.” Instead of un-
doing patriarchy, the cases work to undo progress.
This turn is already happening. Last year, the Supreme Court
of India issued its decision in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, sharply
curtailing police authority to make arrests on complaints of dowry
harassment.209 Prior to this decision, police were able to make arrests
immediately, and hold the accuseds until a bail hearing.210 These
provisions were intended to overcome police bias and inertia in dowry
violence cases.211 It provided victims with immediate safety, at least
for a few days.212 Arnesh requires police show sufficient grounds for
207. Subrahmanyam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 2 SCR 666, 689.
208. Rashmi Goel, Sita’s Trousseau: Restorative Justice, Domestic Violence, and South
Asian Culture, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 639, 646–47, 649 (2005).
209. Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, Cr. A. No. 1277 of 2014, at 16–17 (SC, July 2,
2014).
210. See id. at 3.
211. See id.
212. See id.
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arrest in front of a magistrate before an arrest can be made.213 In
part, the Court asserted a need to check state power, particularly
since police corruption is well-recognized.214 But the core of its deci-
sion was based upon allegations of Section 498A abuse.215 Many
cases, it was alleged, were simply trumped up allegations by vindic-
tive wives who wanted to fleece their husbands and parents-in-law.216
Men’s groups were protesting that the laws had gone too far, and
were now being used to harass innocent men, their aging parents,
and even innocent sisters-in-law who resided abroad.217 Based on
the lower rate of convictions in Section 498A cases, and the specter
of false allegations, the court declared that 498A “[held] a dubious
place of pride among the provisions that are used as weapons rather
than shield [sic] by disgruntled wives.” 218 Despite evidence that es-
tablished that the rate of false allegations is no more than in other
criminal cases,219 the “disgruntled wife” is held up for her failure to
emulate the ideal wife’s patient fortitude. Although India has a long
history of prioritizing larger social goals over civil rights, here the
prospect of the false allegation was enough to drive a substantial
reduction in protections for all complainants.220
Similarly, other cases involving the interpretation of Section 498A
and Section 304B have limited their application. For instance, the
time prior to death in which dowry harassment must have occurred
has been shortened—one week is too long in some cases.221 “Soon be-
fore her death” has been characterized as an “elastic expression” 222
dependent upon the circumstances, and intervening periods of rec-
onciliation have been held sufficient to break any causal chain.223 A
killer from the extended family who does not reside with the groom
and bride will not count as a relative, even if the killing was related
to dowry harassment, so the groom’s maternal uncle is not a relative
213. See id. at 11–13. This does not prevent police from making arrests if they actually
witness dowry violence and need to intervene, but it prevents immediate arrest on a
complaint alone.
214. Id. at 5.
215. Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, Cr. A. No. 1277 of 2014, at 3 (SC, July 2, 2014).
216. See id. at 3–4.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 3.
219. See Samanwaya Rautray, Section 498A: Has Supreme Court Taken a Retrograde
Step by Diluting an Anti-Harassment Law?, ECON. TIMES, (July 20, 2014, 4:00 AM),
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-07-20/news/51780217_1_ncrb-csr-apex
-court [http://perma.cc/52WU-CYEH].
220. Much as the specter of the false rape allegation has controlled the law in the field
of rape. The search for truth and the protection of women in have become secondary to
the defendant’s rights, despite a near epidemic of rape in American society.
221. Prem Kumar v. State of Kerala, Cr. A. No. 2088 of 2008, (SC, Dec. 19, 2008).
222. Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2001) 8 SCC 633, para. 27.
223. Mustafa Shahadal Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 11 SCC 397, para. 8.
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for the purposes of Section 304B according to one case.224 Despite
Supreme Court statements on the deeming provisions to the contrary,
one high court judge has asserted that some causal connection to the
dowry dispute must also be proven. Early dicta that called for the
death penalty in every dowry murder case was quickly dialed back,
so that the death penalty has only been imposed, though never car-
ried out, in one case so far since 1985.225 In other words, the broad
power and coverage of Sections 498A and 304B are slowly being
chipped away. They too, it appears, are becoming complicit in the
patriarchal power structure, despite their good intentions and hon-
est grief over the increase in dowry death rates.
Courts do not seem aware of the ways repressive attitudes about
women are being subtly upheld in their support of cultural traditions,
feminine ideals, and observations on family relations. The judges un-
questioningly accept the simplistic framing of dowry violence as a
monetary crime.226 Predictably this elicits monetary solutions; courts
and legislatures suggest increased education and financial indepen-
dence for women will ultimately eradicate dowry deaths.227 But dowry
death victims already comprise many educated and financially in-
dependent women; this alone is not a solution. Ultimately, the focus
on dowry greed as the singular motivation for dowry killings detracts
from a more sophisticated examination of the multiple factors that
support the patriarchal structure and the power structures that op-
press women in Indian society. Without tackling the other practices
that support the patriarchal power structure, dowry deaths will con-
tinue to occur as violent symptoms of that power structure.
CONCLUSION
The women who kill women present a multilayered and complex
crisis with no ready solution. India’s current approach to dowry
224. See HC Drops Dowry Charges Against Distant Relative of Husband, TIMES OF
INDIA (July 16, 2010, 5:51 AM), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ahmedabad/HC
-drops-dowry-charges-against-distant-relative-of-husband/articleshow/6173730.cms
[http://perma.cc/N8PN-2XK6].
225. Although State (Delhi) v. Laxman Kumar was the first case in which the death pen-
alty was imposed by the trial judge, the sentence was never carried out as the Supreme
Court ultimately converted the punishment to life imprisonment. In subsequent cases
where lower courts imposed capital punishment, appellate courts similarly have reduced
the sentence to life imprisonment. See, e.g., State of Madhya Pradesh v. Manmohan
Choubey, (1994) 3 Crimes 776. For additional discussion of sentencing for dowry death,
consider VINAY SHARMA, DOWRY DEATHS: LEGAL PROVISIONS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRE-
TATION 55–62 (2007). See also LAW COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 109.
226. See Venkatesan, supra note 196.
227. See, e.g., Subrahmanyam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 2 SCR 666, paras.
3.01–02 (India).
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deaths is grossly inadequate. It does not matter how many mother-
in-law wings are added at Tihar jail; reliance on the criminal law will
always be inadequate when the problem is greater than criminal
behavior. To solve this problem, we must first recognize that the
readily observable evils, like dowry deaths, are mere symptoms of
patriarchy, not incarnations. Working to eradicate the symptoms will
never be enough without addressing the underlying conditions that
give rise to those symptoms. This study reveals that the influence
of patriarchy survives in socially venerated acts as much as criminal
ones. Patriarchy is not only pervasive but insidious. It absorbs as
much as it oppresses, and co-opts as much as it controls.
The larger question then is “How does one dismantle the patri-
archal power structure when the objects of its oppression are com-
plicit with its operation?” The answer will not be easy. For decades,
Indian feminists have fought for equality in classrooms and board-
rooms, out in the public sphere. These problems though, like Gandhi’s
cotton, are homespun. In the face of such intricate oppressions, to
effect the profound social changes necessary, the revolution needs
to return to the source: it needs to start at home.
